Working around China
In 2008, India was able to get a waiver from the NSG as an exceptional case allowing it to engage in international commerce in civilian nuclear technology and equipment even though, as a nuclear weapon state, it did not have all its nuclear facilities under international safeguards as required by the group. China was opposed to the waiver but did not take a public stand on it. It encouraged countries like Ireland, New Zealand, Austria and Switzerland to oppose a consensus on the waiver for India, arguing that it would seriously undermine the NPT, that it would upset the nuclear balance in South Asia and trigger a nuclear arms race, and that a criteria-based rather than a country-specific approach should be adopted in order to avoid the charge of discriminatory practice. This was conveyed to me by the then New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark when I called on her to solicit her country’s support at the NSG.
However, whenever the issue was raised with the Chinese in meetings between our top leaders or senior officials, the response was a standard mantra: China welcomes the opportunity to promote civil nuclear cooperation with India, but would not want to undermine in any way the international non-proliferation regime. This was ambiguous enough to give China tactical flexibility at the NSG. In light of this ambiguous public posture, our assessment was that if a broad consensus could be built on granting India a waiver, China would not be the one country to raise its hand and oppose the decision. And this is precisely what happened. On the morning of September 6, 2008, even before the last holdout countries like Ireland, New Zealand and Austria had formally dropped their opposition, China conveyed a message to the Indian delegation that it had decided to support the draft waiver decision.click here to fetch the details.
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